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Globalization, Domestic Institutions and Enforcement of Labor Law:  







This paper provides new measures of government enforcement of labor regulations in 
Latin America and explores how it is affected by external and domestic factors. Using a 
panel of presidential terms in 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 2009, I find 
that trade openness has a negative effect on inspection resources and activities, and that 
parties on the left of the political spectrum increase enforcement when they are in power. 
I also find that FDI penetration has a positive effect on inspection activities, but the 
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Most developing countries have extensive labor regulations, but there is widespread 
concern that these regulations are not fully enforced. How many resources and effort do 
developing countries devote to enforce their labor laws? Do we observe changes over 
time? Which factors explain enforcement? Does economic globalization produce a race 
to bottom, wherein governments reduce enforcement in order to compete and attract 
foreign capital? Does enforcement respond to the demands of local interest groups and 
their elected representatives? Despite the importance of these questions little empirical 
research is available. 
This paper presents new measures of government enforcement of labor regulations for 18 
Latin American countries from 1985 to 2009, and empirically explores how international 
and domestic factors shape enforcement in the region. Enforcement plays an important 
role according to several literatures as described below, but lack of data has so far 
prevented testing these theories. This paper attempts to contribute towards filling this 
gap. 
There is debate whether economic globalization improves labor standards in developing 
countries. Neumayer and Soysa (2006) find that countries that are more open to trade 
have fewer collective labor rights violations, while Mosley and Uno (2007) find the 
contrary effect, although they also find that foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are 
negatively associated with violations. The “racing to the bottom” or “climbing to the top” 
debate is in part about how governments in developing countries react to the competitive 
pressure and the dislocation effects of globalization. Do they turn a blind eye to labor 
regulations in order to reduce labor costs, and hence remain competitive and retain or 
 3 
attract FDI? Or do they increase enforcement in order to expand the coverage of the 
employment protection system, and hence compensate workers for the uncertainties and 
dislocations produced by globalization? Do multinational corporations induce 
governments to improve the rule of law? While it seems apparent that globalization has 
altered the margins of choice available to governments, we still know little about how it 
has affected a key policy instrument: labor inspections. I find that trade openness has a 
negative effect on government enforcement resources and activities and FDI has a 
positive impact on inspections, although the latter result is more imprecise. These results 
suggest that government enforcement is an important factor mediating the relationship 
between economic globalization and working conditions. 
Enforcement is likely to be affected not only by external, but also internal factors. 
Furthermore, recent studies of labor regulation in developing countries stress the 
importance of domestic variables. Political scientists show that political legacies, local 
interest group and their elected representatives played a key role in shaping labor codes in 
the region (Botero et al. 2004; Cook 2007; Murillo 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005). A 
principal finding is that parties on the left of the political spectrum are more likely to 
introduce pro-labor legislation when in power in order to keep labor supporters despite 
the external pressures towards deregulation. This literature has made an important 
headway in understanding labor law but it has not analyzed enforcement. This is a 
shortcoming given the low levels of compliance with labor regulations in the developing 
world. Partisanship and interest group theory is based on the effective treatment a group 
receives rather than in-form benefits. Clearly, employees would benefit little from a new 
law that increases severance pay if employers do not comply. Therefore, testing the 
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relevance of partisanship politics and interest group theory requires analyzing both laws 
and enforcement. Do left-leaning governments effectively increase enforcement? Or do 
they only focus on introducing in-form benefits which are more visible to the electorate? 
I find that left-oriented governments are more likely to increase enforcement, and this 
finding is robust to different measures of government enforcement and the inclusion of 
alternative controls. 
Other domestic factors could also affect enforcement. If the primary objective of 
enforcement agencies is deterrence (Garvie and Keeler, 1994), then we should expect 
more enforcement when there is lower compliance with regulations. But, if the goal is 
social welfare maximization (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000), and if enforcement produces 
some informal job destruction, then enforcers could reduce inspections when 
unemployment is high even if compliance is low. The degree of urbanization could also 
affect enforcement resources, since it takes more time to enforce regulations in 
economies with higher spatial decentralization. Several studies show the relevance of the 
“task environment” to explain enforcement behavior (Kagan 1989; Scholz and Gray 
1997). But these studies focus on developed countries, which tend to have more 
professional and independent bureaucracies compared to developing countries. Whether 
these factors affect enforcement in developing countries is still an open question. 
This paper explores how political and economic factors, both international and domestic, 
shape government enforcement of labor regulations in 18 Latin American countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. The first challenge is to adequately measure enforcement. In the 
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next section I present a number of new measures and discuss their strengths and 
limitations. I describe the research design, present results, and discuss the implication of 
the findings in the final section. 
 
2. Measuring Inspection Resources and Activities 
There is no single source of information to measure labor inspection agencies’ resources 
and activities in Latin America. Therefore, I compiled data and statistics from ministries 
websites, newspapers, reports produced by the ILO, the US Department of Labor, the US 
State Department, and a survey of country experts in an effort to build the most 
comprehensive dataset possible.1 This dataset is an updated version of the data in 
Murillo, Ronconi and Schrank (2009).  
The collected information is mainly quantitative, but in some cases qualitative, and 
includes several measures of enforcement resources and activities. Data about resources 
usually refers to the number of inspectors who are responsible for enforcing any type of 
labor regulation in the country, i.e., general labor inspectors. In some cases, however, the 
available data refers to the number of inspectors enforcing a specific regulation, e.g., 
child labor, or covering a specific geographic area. There is very little information about 
the education and wages of inspectors, or about other inspection resources such as 
computers and vehicles. Data about activities usually refers to the total number of 
inspections conducted per year, but for some countries the available figures are for the 
number of fines imposed or the number of workers covered in the inspections. Little 
information is available about the amount of fines imposed or whether those fines are 
effectively collected. 
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To construct measures of enforcement I use the presidential term as the unit of analysis. I 
exclude dictators and presidents who were in power for twelve months or less. Based on 
these criteria there are a total of 102 presidential terms in the 18 Latin American 
countries between 1985 and 2009. 
I begin with a variant of the ILO’s standard enforcement indicator: the ratio of labor 
inspectors to the economically active population (EAP). Inspectorsi is defined as the ratio 
between the average number of general labor inspectors during presidential term i over 
the average EAP (in millions) during the same period. Second, I define Inspectionsi as the 
ratio between the average number of inspections conducted per year during i over the 
average EAP (in thousands). In some cases the available data covers all years of the 
presidential term. When the data covers only a fraction of the term, I assume that the 
value of the unobserved years equals the average value of the observed years. 
The advantages of these two measures are they usefulness to make comparisons both 
across and within countries over time, and the fact that they provide a quantitative 
measure of enforcement resources and activities. An important limitation, however, is 
their low coverage. The data covers 64 of the 102 presidential terms for Inspectors and 41 
for Inspections. Furthermore, these two measures exclude a fraction of the quantitative 
data collected (for instance, data on provincial inspectors or on the number of fines 
imposed), and all the qualitative information obtained in the survey. Therefore, I 
construct a third measure –Enforcement Index– which is an ordinal variable that ranks the 
presidential terms in each country using all the collected information. It is constructed as 
follows: First, I use the available data on enforcement activity (whether it is inspections, 
fines imposed or workers covered in the inspections). The presidential term with the 
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lowest level of activity receives a value equal to zero; the presidential term with the 
second lowest level of activity receives a value equal to one, and so on. Then, I fill the 
empty cells with data on enforcement resources and the qualitative information.2 The 
same procedure is applied to each country. After following this procedure, I obtain a 
measure of enforcement for 88 out of the 102 presidential terms. 
The Enforcement Index is unbalanced over time. It is available for less than half of the 
presidential terms that took place in the late eighties (7 out of 16), for almost 90 percent 
of the terms in the nineties (37 out of 42), and for all the terms in the 2000-2009 period 
(44 out of 44). It is also unbalanced across countries. As shown in table 1, data is 
available for every presidential term in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. However, it only covers three 
out of six presidential terms in Colombia and four out of eight in Ecuador.  
<Table 1> 
Table 1 also presents the average value of Inspectors and Inspections for each country 
during 1985-2009. Panama with 67.3 inspectors per million EAP presents the highest 
value and Venezuela with 7.8 the lowest. Resources in most countries fall below the 
threshold recommended by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR),3 and are usually low compared to 
European countries but high relative to developing countries in Africa and Asia for which 
data is available.4 Latin American countries with more inspectors tend to conduct more 
inspections, although the correlation is moderate (0.4 in the sample). Dominican Republic 
has the highest value of inspections per EAP, and Colombia and Paraguay the lowest.  
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Table 2 presents the evolution of enforcement over time for each country. Panel A shows 
the average number of inspectors by decade and panel B the average number of 
inspections. No clear pattern emerges on the evolution of enforcement resources and 
activities over time in the region because there is large heterogeneity across countries. In 
Argentina and Uruguay –the only two countries for which data about resources in the late 
1980s is available- the number of inspectors decreased during the 1990s and increased in 
the 2000s. There also was an increase in enforcement resources between the 1990s and 
2000s in Colombia, Guatemala, Panama and Peru; and a reduction in Bolivia, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico and Paraguay. Enforcement activities increased 
between the 1990s and 2000s in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Uruguay; and decreased in Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico.  
<Table 2> 
Another salient feature of the data is the magnitude of the changes. The median increase 
in the number of inspectors per worker between the 1990s and 2000s is 61 percent and 
the median reduction is 34 percent. This variation is large compared to changes in public 
employment in the region. Between 1995 and 2005, the median increase in total public 
employment per worker is 11 percent and the median reduction is 14 percent. These 
figures suggest that enforcement is quite volatile. I discuss next which factors could 
explain these variations. 
 
3. External and Domestic Determinants of Enforcement 
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A number of studies describe the institutional features of labor inspection in Latin 
America, how agencies are administratively organized, their powers, the duties of labor 
inspectors, and other legal issues.5 Labor inspection is usually organized as a ministerial 
department under the authority of the labor ministry. The executive power has large 
control over the resources. Contrary to what is observed in the United States, Congress 
has little influence over inspection agencies in Latin America.6 
The executive power is likely to have more control over inspection resources relative to 
inspections activities since it is costly to monitor the behavior of labor inspectors. 
Moreover, Piore and Schrank (2008) argue that the model of inspection in the Latin 
world gives more discretion to inspectors relative to their counterparts in the United 
States. This suggests that the preferences of inspectors are likely to play a role in 
explaining enforcement activities. But the greater latitude of inspectors in Latin America 
could be more apparent than real because in many cases they do not have job security, 
and hence have incentives to follow the instructions of their bosses who are political 
appointees. Therefore, I expect that the executive power is the main domestic political 
institution determining both inspection resources and activities.  
Whether the government enhances the labor inspectorate depends on a number of 
external and local factors. Exposure to international markets has increased significantly in 
Latin America during the analyzed period. Exports increased from 16 percent of GDP in 
1985 to 23 percent in 2008, and imports increased from 12 percent to 24 percent during 
the same period. The penetration of FDI also experienced a significant increase in the 
region. In South America it grew from 10 percent of GDP in 1985 to 22 percent in 2008 
and in Central America from 6 to 32 percent. Producing a tradable good at the lowest 
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possible cost is central to increasing export share and to winning business for local 
subcontracting firms. Because labor regulations are an important component of 
production costs, economic globalization can induce governments to engage in a “race to 
the bottom” in labor standards. Governments can reduce labor standards either by 
reforming labor codes or by turning a blind eye to noncompliance. The latter can be a 
politically preferable option because it is less visible to the electorate. Empirical studies 
in Latin America do not find any significant effect of trade openness of the likelihood of 
labor law deregulation (Murillo, 2005; Murillo and Schrank, 2005), but we still know 
little about the impact of trade on enforcement. To test this hypothesis I use the ratio of 
the sum of exports and imports to GDP as the measure of Trade Openness. Economic 
globalization can also affect enforcement via the penetration of FDI. Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) can press governments to improve the rule of law, but it is likely 
that they will do it in a selective manner. If their local competitors are noncompliers, 
MNCs will benefit if the government enforces labor regulations in those firms. But if 
MNCs’ local suppliers are noncompliers, they have an economic incentive to press the 
government for turning a blind eye in order to keep the cost of their inputs low. I use the 
stock of FDI to GDP to test whether MNCs shape enforcement (Stock FDI). Trade data is 
from World Development Indicators and FDI from UNCTAD. 
The strategies adopted by the government also depend on the balance of power among 
domestic interest groups and party organization, and the means citizens have to hold the 
government accountable. Latin American political scientists have shown that parties on 
the left of the political spectrum are more likely to introduce pro-labor legislation when in 
power in order to keep labor supporters and reinforce partisan affinities. This evidence is 
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consistent with the idea that regulation responds to the demands of the government’s 
constituent base. Because workers care about rules-in-use rather than rules-in-form, and 
given the low levels of compliance in the region, it is necessary to also explore whether 
partisan links affects enforcement. To capture Executive Ideology of the government, the 
administrations are coded on an ordinal scale from “left” (-2) to “right” (2), with “center-
left”, “center” and “center-right” in between. The data is from Murillo, Oliveros and 
Vaishnav (2009), based on an updated version of Coppedge’s coding.  
Labor unions in Latin America are relatively weak, particularly in the private sector. 
They are usually organized by sector of economic activity or by firm, and they do not 
represent the large informal sector (Murillo, 2001). Therefore, they are more likely to 
lobby the inspection agency to focus on their own sectors than pressing for an overall 
increase in enforcement. Bensusán (2006) argues that labor unions have done very little 
to increase enforcement in the region, but this is an under researched area (Murrillo and 
Schrank, 2009). Labor union strength, however, could be negatively correlated with 
enforcement because the government may deem less necessary to devote resources to 
inspection activities when labor unions already ensure vigilance of labor standards at the 
workplace. Lack of disaggregated enforcement data prevents testing the impact of labor 
unions on the distribution of inspection resources and activities across sectors or firms; 
and testing the impact of organized labor on the overall level of enforcement is 
complicated due to the lack of reliable indicators of labor union strength. I use a proxy of 
Union Density, which is obtained by combining a number of sources.7 
To test whether the level of democracy is associated with government enforcement, I use 
the revised combined polity score from Marshall and Jaggers (2009) as a measure of 
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Democracy. This variable ranges from 10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy), and 
reflects the following traits: the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation 
on participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the chief executive. Workers are likely to be more effective in political 
systems where participation is unrestricted, open and fully competitive; where constraints 
on the chief executive are substantial; and where executive recruitment is elective.8 
As controls, I include the Unemployment Rate obtained from ILO Laborsta, the share of 
the population living in urban areas (Urbanization Rate) and the Gross National Income 
per capita (GNI per capita) PPP international U$ dollars, both obtained from World 
Development Indicators. Table 3 presents basic statistics. 
<Table 3>  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between Executive Ideology (on the horizontal axe) 
and the Enforcement Index (on the vertical axe). The figure is obtained using the 88 
presidential terms for which quantitative and qualitative data about enforcement is 
available, and the size of the bubble represents the number of administrations in each 
category. There is a clear negative association. Presidential terms characterized as left-
leaning have higher levels of enforcement. 
<Figure 1> 
Figure 2 is a scatter plot of Trade Openness (on the horizontal axe) and Inspectors per 
million workers (on the vertical axe). Using the entire sample suggest a positive 
correlation as the linear trendline shows; that is, the higher the level of trade openness, 
the higher the level of enforcement resources. There are a number of reasons why this 
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correlation cannot be interpreted as a causal effect of trade openness on enforcement. One 
reason is omitted variable bias. Smaller countries, for example, are more likely to have a 
larger share of trade to GDP and also more inspectors per worker due to economies of 
scale. This problem can be partially overcome by analyzing the evolution of trade and 
enforcement over time within countries. Actually, a different picture emerges when 
comparing the evolution within countries. In Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico and 
Paraguay the increase in trade is associated with a reduction in enforcement, although in 




4. The Model 
The generic version of the model is: 
Yi = β Ideologyi + γ Trade Opennessi + δ FDI Stocki + Xiθ + αD + λT + εi , (1) 
where Yi is a measure of government enforcement of labor regulations during 
administration i, X is a vector of controls, i.e., democracy, unemployment, GNI per 
capita, union density and urbanization, D is a set of country dummies or fixed effects, and 
T is a vector of decade effects. The coefficients β, γ and δ capture the effect of ideology, 
trade and FDI on enforcement.  
Because enforcement can affect the economic variables on the right hand side of the 
equation, the model includes a lagged level of trade openness, FDI, unemployment, 
urbanization and union density. This lagged level is equal to the value adopted by the 
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variable the year before the president began her/his term. For example, the corresponding 
value of Trade Openness for President Evo Morales, who took power in January 2006, is 
the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP in 2005. The coefficients are estimated using 
OLS when the dependent variable is either Inspectors or Inspections and using the 
ordered logit model for Enforcement Index. 
 
5. Results 
I begin estimating equation (1) without including country fixed effects. Column 1 in 
Table 4 presents the result for Inspectors, column 4 for Inspections and column 7 for the 
Enforcement Index. There is a negative association between the ideology of the 
government and enforcement and a positive association between trade and enforcement 
resources as figures 1 and 2 above suggest. 
Columns 2, 5 and 8, present the results including country fixed effects. While this method 
reduces statistical power, and hence carries the risk that causal hypothesis will be rejected 
prematurely, it also increases our confidence that results which do emerge as significant 
are not the consequence of inappropriate econometric methods. The results do confirm 
that governments on the left are more likely to increase enforcement than governments on 
the right of the political spectrum.  
Trade openness, on the other hand, becomes negatively and statistically significant 
correlated with both enforcement resources and activities. This suggests that when trade 
represents a larger share of total production, governments are more likely to turn a blind 
eye to noncompliance with labor standards.  
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Penetration of FDI is positively correlated with inspection activities, but only at the 0.10 
level of significance. The remaining covariates usually have the expected sign. 
Enforcement tends to increase as countries become more democratic, richer, less 
urbanized and when organized labor is stronger.  
<Table 4> 
These estimates are obtained using an unbalanced panel. The variable Inspectors is 
available for 64 out of the 102 presidential terms, Inspections for 41, and the Enforcement 
Index for 88. If the missing observations are systematically related to the response 
variable, then the estimates would be biased. I test for selection bias following 
Wooldridge (2002:581), and find no evidence that the pattern of missing observations 
affects the results.9 
Finally, columns 3, 6 and 9 present additional estimates aimed at checking the robustness 
of the results to alternative specifications. The quality of the measures of enforcement is 
likely to vary across presidential terms due to unobserved years. For example, the 
collected data covering the second Menem administration in Argentina (1995-1999) only 
includes the number of labor inspectors in a single year, while there is data for every year 
of Kirchner’s administration (2003-2007). Hence, the variable Inspectors is more reliable 
for the Kirchner compared to the Menem administration. To account for potential 
differences in the quality of the measures of enforcement, I weight the regression models 
by the number of observations used to calculate the average serving as the dependent 
variable. 
Overall, the results change little. The effect of trade openness and right-oriented 
governments on enforcement resources and activities remains negative and statistically 
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significant showing the robustness of the results to alternative statistical assumptions. The 
impact of FDI on the enforcement index becomes positive and significant. These results 
suggest that the observed variety of effects of globalization on working conditions found 
by Mosley and Uno (2007) –that is, FDI penetration improves and trade openness 
worsens labor rights– are in part due to how governments change enforcement in 
response to international competition. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents new measures of government enforcement of labor regulations in 
Latin America from 1985 to 2009. The data shows that most countries in the region fall 
below the inspector per worker threshold recommended by the ILO, and that there is no 
clear trend in enforcement in the region during the analyzed period due to large 
heterogeneity across countries. The paper then explores how external and domestic 
factors shape enforcement. I find that more trade openness and less FDI are associated 
with less enforcement, and that left-oriented governments and more democratic 
governments tend to increase enforcement. Because the results are obtained analyzing 
changes within countries over time, I am more confident that they capture a causal effect. 
These results are consistent with the idea that governments react to the competitive 
pressures produced by trade opening by turning a blind eye to noncompliance with labor 
regulations, but increase enforcement in response to pressures from foreign investors who 
seek to avoid competition from local non-compliers. The results also suggest that the 
government reacts to the demands of their constituent base to keep their support and 
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reinforce partisan affinities, and that workers are more effective in more democratic 
systems. 
The data in this paper measures the overall level of enforcement resources and activities 
by presidential term. Such a level of aggregation does not allow testing a number of 
hypotheses. First, MNCs are more likely to lobby over the distribution of inspection 
resources and activities rather than the overall level. Furthermore, because Latin 
American countries do not have encompassing labor unions and business associations, 
these domestic interest groups are also more likely to focus on the distribution of 
enforcement. Hence, analyzing the distribution of inspections by economic sector of 
activity or firm would allow a deeper comprehension about the influence of these 
actors.10 Second, the dataset contains no information regarding styles of inspection. Piore 
and Schrank (2008:4) argue that there is a Latin model of inspection, more pedagogical 
than adversarial compared to the United States; inspectors in Latin American “hope to 
coach, coax and, only occasionally, coerce firms into compliance with the letter and spirit 
of the law.” According to Bensusán (2007), until the nineties most countries in the region 
pursued a punitive strategy to increase compliance, while nowadays most countries put 
more emphasis on educational and prevention activities. An open question is whether this 
change in inspection style is a reaction to the pressures of economic globalization. Third, 
the available data tells little about the efficiency and equity of the enforcement service. 
Workers would gain little if inspectors are inoperative, corrupt, or if they only inspect 
firms that are already in compliance. Although there are accusations against corrupt labor 
inspector in most countries in the region, Piore and Schrank (2008) find that corruption 
among Latin American labor inspectors is less common than is generally believed. 
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Finally, much could be gained by analyzing a longer period. This paper focuses on the 
last two decades, but government inspection agencies have been created at the beginning 
of the twenty century in most Latin American countries.11 Exploring which factors 
influenced their creation, and how they have been affected by the large economic and 
political changes experienced in the region, would provide a better understanding of the 
determinants of enforcement of labor regulations. 
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Notes 
                                               
1 The survey was conducted between March and June 2009. Country experts from the 18 countries were 
asked to rank administrations based on the resources devoted to enforce labor regulations. Responses were 
received from 11 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela).  
2 There are a few cases of conflicting information. I rank the Morales administration in Bolivia above the 
Sánchez de Lozada administration because there was a 30 percent increase in the number of inspectors per 
worker, although the country expert from Bolivia suggests that there was no change between them. I rank 
the Colom administration in Guatemala above the Berger administration because the number of inspections 
per worker almost doubled, although there was a reduction in the number of inspectors per worker as 
mentioned by the country expert. I rank the Kirchner administration in Argentina above the Fernandez 
because the annual number of firms inspected decreased, although the country expert suggests an increase 
in the number of inspectors. Finally, I rank the Lugo and the Frutos administrations in Paraguay in the same 
position because the reduction in the number of inspectors occurred due to firing corrupt inspectors. 
3 The number of labor inspectors in relation to workers should approach the following: 100 inspectors per 
million workers for industrial market economies, 67 for rapidly industrializing economies and 25 for least 
developed countries (ILO, 2006). 
4 Based on the figures in ILO (2006), the number of labor inspectors per million EAP is 104 in Bulgaria, 
207 in Greece, 250 in Denmark, 12 in Cameroon and 6 in Philippines.  
5 For a comparison across-countries see Jatobá (2002), Bensusán (2007), and Vega Ruiz (2009). For 
country-specific studies see Bensusán (2006) and Romero Gudiño (2008) for Mexico, Cardoso and Lage 
(2006) for Brazil, Godinez Vargas (2008) for Costa Rica, Marin Boscan (2008) for Venezuela, Molina 
(2008) for Colombia, Ortega Castillo (2008) for Nicaragua, Topet (2008) for Argentina and Ugarte Cataldo 
(2008) for Chile. 
6 See Scholz (1991) for an analysis of the role of Congress on OSHA. 
7 Union density is constructed as follows: First, I use the data from the ILO Laborsta. Then, I fill the empty 
cells using Forteza and Rama (2006), Saavedra and Torero (2002), Cortazar (1997), Feldman (1991), 
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Cassoni, Labadie and Fachola (2002). Finally, I assume that the missing value in year t is equal to the 
average value between t-1 and t+1. 
8 Bensusán (2007) argues that military regimes produced a deterioration of government inspection in Latin 
America during the eighties, although she does not provide any quantitative evidence. Jatobá (2002) points 
out that the return to democracy in Chile in 1990 produced a large increase in labor inspection resources. 
The sample in this paper excludes dictators, and hence, the analysis is restricted to a comparison between 
elected governments with different levels of democracy. 
9 Define s
j,i 
=1 if the dependent variable in country j during presidential term i is observed, and zero 
otherwise. The test consists of adding a lagged selection indicator, s
j,i-1
, to the equation, estimating the 
model by fixed effects, and testing for the significance of s
j,i-1
.   
10 Mosley (2008) highlights the importance of analyzing not only the levels, but also the composition of 
FDI and trade. 
11 Argentina in 1912, Uruguay in 1913, Chile in 1919, Peru in 1920, Brazil in 1921, Colombia and Panama 
in 1923, Bolivia in 1924, Ecuador and Guatemala in 1926, Dominican Republic and Mexico in 1930, 
Venezuela in 1936, Nicaragua in 1945, El Salvador in 1946, Costa Rica in 1949 and Honduras in 1959 
(Romero Gudiño, 2008; Ortega Castillo, 2008; Godinez Vargas, 2008). 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Relationship between Ideology of the Government and Enforcement, 18 Latin 
























Figure 2 – Relationship between Trade Openness and Enforcement Resources, 18 Latin 
































































Table 1 – Measures of enforcement resources and activities in 18 Latin American 





No. of presidential 
terms where 





No. of Annual 
Inspections per 
thousand workers 
Argentina 7 7 15.4 3.8 
Bolivia 6 6 10.3 - 
Brazil 6 5 37.0 4.3 
Chile 4 4 52.6 13.7 
Colombia 6 3 14.4 0.3 
Costa Rica 6 4 55.6 6.3 
Dominican Rep. 6 6 54.8 17.7 
Ecuador 8 4 10.8 -               
El Salvador 6 5 37.2 5.1 
Guatemala 6 6 53.9 1.7 
Honduras 6 5 42.6 4.2 
Mexico 5 5 8.3 1.1 
Nicaragua 5 4 40.6 1.1 
Panama 4 4 67.3 5.5 
Paraguay 5 5 25.1 0.3 
Peru 5 5 14.6 7.3 
Uruguay 5 5 58.5 3.2 
Venezuela 6 5 7.8 - 
Observations 102 88 64 41 
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Table 2 –Inspection resources and activities, by country and decade 
Panel A 
Inspectors per million workers 
Panel B  
Inspections per thousand workers Country 
Late 1980s 1990s 2000s Late 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Argentina 17.3 7.7 22.3 - 1.3 5.0 
Bolivia - 22.3 4.3 - - - 
Brazil - 42.0 33.7 - 5.2 3.7 
Chile - - 52.6 - 10.0 17.4 
Colombia - 13.9 14.7 - 0.3 0.4 
Costa Rica - 64.5 46.7 - 8.1 5.4 
Dominican Rep. - 55.0 54.8 - - 17.7 
Ecuador - 17.5 8.6 - -          - 
El Salvador - - 37.2 - 1.8 6.2 
Guatemala - 31.0 61.5 - - 1.7 
Honduras - 48.7 36.6 - - 4.2 
Mexico - 10.4 6.2 - 1.3 0.7 
Nicaragua - - 40.6 - 0.7 1.3 
Panama - 64.6 68.7 - - 5.5 
Paraguay - 32.3 17.9 - 0.3          - 
Peru - 8.8 20.4 - - 7.3 
Uruguay 56.2 52.8 65.5 - 2.7 3.6 
Venezuela - - 7.8 - - - 
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Table 3 – Basic statistics 





Inspectors per million workers 34.4 21.2 7.8 64 
Inspections per 1,000 workers 5.0 5.0 1.9 41 
Enforcement Index 1.4 1.2 1.1 88 
Executive Ideology 0.2 1.3 1.1 102 
Trade/GDP 58.3 30.9 13.7 102 
FDI Stock 19.4 15.3 10.2 102 
Democracy 7.4 2.2 1.7 102 
Union Density 17.5 9.9 4.8 102 
Unemployment Rate 8.6 4.4 2.7 102 
Urbanization Rate 65.3 15.4 3.9 102 





Table 4 – Determinants of Government Enforcement of Labor Regulations in 18 Latin American countries, 1985-2009  
 Inspectors per million workers Inspections per thousand workers Enforcement Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Executive ideology -3.73** -3.92*** -3.26*** -0.81 -0.92** -0.67* -0.49** -0.79*** -0.87*** 
 (1.85) (1.04) (0.98) (0.52) (0.44) (0.39) (0.22) (0.27) (0.30) 
Trade/GPD 0.18* -0.19** -0.20** 0.01 -0.12** -0.10* -0.001 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
FDI stock -0.21 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.11* 0.12 -0.01 0.04 0.09* 
 (0.19) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) 
Democracy 5.28*** 2.87** 2.34* 0.40 0.92 1.02 -0.01 0.12 0.29 
 (1.40) (1.34) (1.40) (0.33) (0.55) (0.62) (0.08) (0.18) (0.19) 
Union Density 0.12 0.43 0.32 0.01 0.30* 0.36* 0.04 0.04 0.14 
 (0.29) (0.48) (0.47) (0.10) (0.17) (0.20) (0.02) (0.08) (0.12) 
Unemployment 0.56 0.49 0.45 0.22 0.14 0.25 -0.013 -0.08 -0.02 
 (0.64) (0.38) (0.42) (0.33) (0.14) (0.22) (0.054) (0.14) (0.16) 
Urbanization -0.47 -1.84*** -1.88*** -0.11 -0.17 -0.01 0.02 -0.13 -0.35* 
 (0.45) (0.66) (0.64) (0.10) (0.33) (0.34) (0.06) (0.15) (0.18) 
GNI per capita 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 64 64 64 41 41 41 88 88 88 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in columns 1 to 6 are estimated using OLS, and in columns 7 to 9 using the ordered logit model. 
Columns 3, 6, and 9 are weighted by the number of observations used to construct the dependent variable.  
* Significant at the 0.1 level, ** at the 0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level.  
